Abstract: A class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems is de ned.
Introduction
The operations research literature o ers numerous algorithms and heuristics for network optimization problems. In game theoretic approaches to network optimization problems, di erent agents control the elements of the network. Next to nding optimal solutions, this adds the problem of dividing the costs or bene ts generated by such solutions over the involved agents. Curiel (1997) provides an overview of several classes of games arising from problems in operations research.
Only recently, Fragnelli, Garc a-Jurado, and M endez-Naya (1999) have initiated a game theoretic approach to shortest path problems. They study a class of cooperative shortest path games in which the transportation of a good from a source to a sink of a network generates an externally given income. The nodes in the network are owned by the players. The value of a coalition is de ned by the net income this coalition can realize by transporting the good through the network via a shortest path, using only nodes that are owned by the players in the coalition (or zero, if the net income happens to be negative). The corresponding class of cooperative games is shown to coincide with the class of monotonic games. Therefore, shortest path games need not have core elements. For a shortest path game to be balanced, two rather strong restrictions have to be ful lled: a certain reduced game needs to be balanced, and certain veto players have to take important positions in the game. Their paper ends with an axiomatization of the Shapley value of shortest path games.
As opposed to the model of Fragnelli et al. (1999) , where the income or reward for transporting a good from source to sink is not associated with a speci c player, the present paper introduces a class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems where there is a reward (possibly equal to zero) for each player if he transports his goods from source to sink. The de nition of the cooperative shortest path games is given in Section 2. In Section 3, it is shown that these shortest path games are (totally) balanced. Possible methods for obtaining core elements are indicated by relating to the allocation rules in taxation (cf. Young, 1987 Young, , 1990 ) and bankruptcy problems (cf. Aumann and Maschler, 1985) . Every e cient allocation in which each player contributes a nonnegative amount not exceeding his reward to the costs of the shortest path, yields a core element of the shortest path game. Sprumont (1990) introduces the notion of a population-monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) for a cooperative game (N; v). A PMAS speci es for each coalition S N of players an allocation of the value v(S) over its members. Moreover, it re ects the intuition that there is`strength in numbers': for each i 2 N and each pair of coalitions S; T with i 2 S T N, the share of v(T) allocated to i is at least as large as the share of v(S) allocated to i. It is shown in Section 3 that each shortest path game has a PMAS. In Section 4, an allocation rule is constructed that takes opportunity costs into account by considering the costs of the second best alternative and that rewards players who are crucial to the construction of the shortest path. Finally, Section 5 introduces noncooperative games arising from shortest path problems. In such a strategic game, players make bids or claims on certain paths. It is shown that the core allocations of the cooperative shortest path game exactly coincide with the payo vectors in the strong 2 Nash equilibria of the associated noncooperative shortest path game.
Notation: For a nite set N, 2 N = fS j S Ng denotes the collection of all subsets of N. For (x i ) i2N , where x i 2 I R for each i 2 N, and for a subset S N, we denote x(S) = P i2S x i . I R denotes the set of reals, I R + = 0; 1) the set of nonnegative reals. For a; b 2 I R we de ne a^b := minfa; bg. The end of proofs is indicates with the symbol 2, the end of de nitions, examples, and remarks with the symbol /.
Shortest path games
In this section shortest path problems and their associated cooperative games are de ned. In the shortest path problems considered in this paper, there is a nite set of players. Each player owns arcs or connections in a nite network. There are costs associated to the use of each arc. Each player receives a nonnegative reward if he manages to transport a good from the source of the network to its sink.
De nition 2.1 A shortest path problem is a tuple hN; V; (A i ) i2N ; w; (r i ) i2N i, where N is a nite set of players; V is a nite set of vertices with two special elements: the source So and the sink Si; each player i 2 N owns a set A i V V of directed arcs in the network; the function w : i2N fig A i ! I R + assigns a weight (or length, or cost) to all the arcs owned by the players. The weight assigned to arc (a; b) owned by player i 2 N is w(i; (a; b)) 2 I R + ; each player i 2 N receives a reward r i 2 I R + for transporting his goods from the source to the sink. /
Notice that more than one player can own an arc between two vertices, and that the costs of an arc can depend on its owner. Several de nitions and results in this paper are illustrated with the following simple example.
Example 2.2 The shortest path problem with player set N = f1; 2; 3g, vertex set V = fSo; Si; vg, the players respectively owning arc sets A 1 = f(So; v); (So; Si)g; A 2 = f(v; Si)g; A 3 = f(So; Si)g, and weights w(1; (So; v)) = w(2; (v; Si)) = 1; w(1; (So; Si)) = 3; w(3; (So; Si)) = 6 is depicted in Figure 1 (where it is assumed that arcs are directed from left to right). The numbers 2; 1 next to the arc (v; Si), for instance, indicate that this arc is owned by player 2 and that the costs of this arc owned by player 2 equal 1. Take the rewards equal to r 1 = r 2 = r 3 = 8. / 
Obviously, if a coalition S has to go from source to sink, it will choose among its alternatives in P(S) the path with minimal costs. De ne for each S 2 2 N n f;g: Shortest paths in directed networks can be determined, for instance, by the algorithm of Dijkstra (1959) . From now on, when we refer to`a shortest path' without explicitly stating a coalition owning it, we mean a shortest path owned by the grand coalition N.
Recall that a cooperative game with transferable utility is a tuple (N; v), where N is a nite set of players and v : 2 N n f;g ! I R is a function that assigns to each coalition S 2 2 N n f;g its value v(S) 2 I R.
The cooperative game associated with a shortest path problem re ects the following intuition: if a coalition S 2 2 N n f;g transports its goods from source to sink, it will receive a total reward r(S) = P i2S r i and incur costs c(S), the costs of the cheapest alternative S has to go from source to sink. If r(S) ? c(S) > 0, coalition S makes a pro t. If r(S) ? c(S) 0, coalition S can generate pro t zero by simply doing nothing. Therefore, coalition S can make a pro t maxfr(S) ? c(S); 0g. In the next section, the core of shortest path games is shown to be nonempty.
3 Core allocations of shortest path games Fragnelli et al. (1999) indicate that in a class of shortest path games where there is a single reward, provided by someone outside the player set, the core may be empty. The purpose of the present section is to indicate that every shortest path game as formulated in De nition 2.3 is totally balanced and has a population-monotonic allocation scheme. Every e cient allocation in which each player contributes a nonnegative amount not exceeding his reward to the costs of the shortest path, yields a core element. Hence, this proportional allocation of the costs yields a core allocation. For each coalition S 2 2 N nf;g, the subgame (S; v) of the shortest path game (N; v) is again a shortest path game and therefore balanced. Consequently, every shortest path game is totally balanced. Sprumont (1990) introduces the notion of a population-monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) for a cooperative game (N; v). A PMAS speci es for each coalition S N of players an allocation of v(S) over its members. Moreover, it re ects the intuition that there is`strength in numbers': the share allocated to each player i 2 N is nondecreasing in the size of the coalitions of which he is a member. Formally, a PMAS for the game (N; v) is a vector (x S;i ) S N;i2S of real numbers such that 8S N : Not all cooperative games have a PMAS. A necessary, but not su cient, condition is that the game (N; v) is totally balanced; see Sprumont (1990, p.380) . De ne x S;i in such a way that player i pays a proportional share of c(S) ( Finding elements of the set B comes down to dividing the costs c(N) of a shortest path over the involved players. Each player i 2 N can take a share between zero and his reward r i . This is exactly a taxation problem (or | under a slightly di erent interpretation | a bankruptcy problem) where the amount to be paid equals c(N) and each player i 2 N has a taxable income r i . The numerous allocation rules that have been proposed in the literature on taxation problems (cf. Young, 1987 Young, , 1990 ) and bankruptcy problems (cf. Aumann and Maschler, 1985) therefore yield core elements of the shortest path game.
4 A rule favoring s-veto players
In the previous section nonemptiness of the core of shortest path games was established by indicating that every e cient allocation in which all players receive a nonnegative amount not exceeding their reward yields a core element. There may be players, however, who are of such importance to the generation of a shortest path, that they can claim in the core a payo that is higher than their reward. In this section, we show that these players are exactly the players owning an arc of every shortest path. Fragnelli et al. (1999) refer to these players as shortest veto players or s-veto players. In their paper, s-veto players must exist to guarantee nonemptiness of the core. We formulate an allocation rule that indeed favors such s-veto players and still yields a core allocation. 
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Without s-veto players, the shortest path cannot be realized. The rule we propose is based on a consideration of opportunity costs, i.e, the costs of the next to shortest path. The s-veto players are rewarded for their powerful position in the network, whereas the remaining players are required to make a large contribution to the costs.
This idea is clearly not applicable if either the set of s-veto players or its complement is empty, or if there is no next to shortest path (i.e., all paths from source to sink have the same length). In those cases, the costs c(N) of the shortest path are simply divided proportional to the rewards of the players: Proof. If the allocation rule is de ned by proportional sharing (3), this yields a core allocation, as was shown in Section 3. It remains to consider the case in which the rule is determined by expressions (5) and (6). Notice: Example 4.5 Suppose that c 2 in (5) and (6) is replaced by c(N n T). In the shortest path game of Example 2.2 and 2.4, c(N n T) = c(f3g) = 6. If player 3 is charged to pay these costs and the excess 6 ? c 1 = 6 ? 2 = 4 is split over the s-veto players in proportion to their rewards, one obtains the allocation y = (10; 10; 2), which is not a core allocation, since y 1 + y 3 = 12 < v(f1; 3g) = 13. / 5 Noncooperative support for the core
In this nal section, we introduce a noncooperative game associated with a shortest path problem hN; V; (A i ) i2N ; w; (r i ) i2N i and prove that the core allocations of the cooperative shortest path game coincide with payo s to strong Nash equilibria in the noncooperative game.
the path p i , he is also allowed to make claims rather than contributions, i.e, then he can also contribute m i < 0. (9) and (10) imply that u i (s) = r i ? m i for each i 2 S, possibly with m i = 0. With (7) and (8) 
The collection R := fp i j i 2 Sg of paths selected by the members of S in strategy combination s is a nonempty, nite set. By (10): R F(s): (14) To derive a contradiction from our initial assumption that S can pro tably deviate from s to s, we discern two cases:
Suppose that the shortest path p used to de ne the initial strategy combination s is chosen by a member of S after deviation to s: p 2 R. This means that in the strategy combination s every player i 2 N in the strategy combination s chooses a path in the set R: members of S do so by de nition and players in N n S choose the path p 2 R. By (14) , all paths in R are indeed paid for by the players in N: 13 combination s all players in S choose a path from the set R and all players in N n S choose the path p = 2 R. By (14) , all paths in R are indeed paid for by the players in S:
where the second inequality follows from the fact that all paths in R F(s) are owned by the members of S and therefore cost at least as much as the shortest path owned by coalition S. Since (u i (s)) i2N = x 2 C(N; v), we also have, using (11) and (12) Since both cases yield a contradiction, it must be that s 2 SNE(G), as was to be shown. would yield a set of feasible paths F(s) n fpg, which is nonempty by our assumption that F(s) contains at least two elements. Hence, each member i 2 S after deviating receives a payo r i > r i ? m i = u i (s), which is an improvement, contradicting s 2 SNE(G).
Therefore, there exists a unique path p such that F(s) = fpg: (18) Combining (17) and (18) 
The path p has to be a shortest path. Suppose, to the contrary, that p is not a shortest path. Select a shortest path q. Since F(s) = fpg: Consequently, m i < 0 for some player i 2 N n S with p i = p. By de nition of a strategy, this player i 2 N n S owns at least one arc on the path p, otherwise he is not allowed to make negative contributions. This implies that S does not own all arcs on the path p. But c(S) = c(N) implies that a path q 6 = p exists that is owned by S and satis es cost(q) = c(S).
In both cases S owns a path q 6 = p with cost(q) = c(S). By (22) 
Remark 5.2 In the strategic shortest path game, a player receives his reward if the set of feasible paths is nonempty, irrespective of whether he chooses a feasible path as part of his strategy. An obvious modi cation of the strategic game would be to give a player his reward only if he chooses a feasible path. One can modify the proof to show that also in that case the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 holds.
An additional modi cation would be to assign payo zero to players selecting a nonfeasible path: players that contribute to a nonfeasible path are paid back their contribution, whereas players making claims on an infeasible path are denied their claim. The resulting payo functions (u i ) i2N would be de ned as follows: Also under this modi cation, Theorem 5.1 remains valid. Both alternative de nitions of the payo functions require only minor changes in the proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof, however, would become longer, without giving more insight. We therefore did not adopt these alternative de nitions. / By de nition of a strategy, players are allowed to make claims only on those paths on which they own arcs. If players would have been allowed to make claims on paths where they own no arcs, the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 is no longer valid. Consider, for instance, the shortest path problem in which N = f1; 2g; r 1 = r 2 = 3, and the network is given in Figure 2 . Suppose we also allow player 2 to make claims on the unique path. It is easy to see that this is a strong Nash equilibrium, but since the non-s-veto player 2 receives a payo 4 > 3 = r 2 , Proposition 4.2 implies that the payo vector (1; 4) is not a core allocation.
